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NO. 24 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
It Is Up to the Government 
Political Lessons Learnt from the 2016 Brexit Referendum 
Barbara Lippert and Erik Brandes 
The arduous process of withdrawing the United Kingdom (UK) from the European 
Union (EU) began shortly after the Brexit referendum in June 2016. The “leave” vote 
plunged the British government into an existential crisis and led to dramatic special 
summits at the EU level. Looking at the British exit vote against the history of EU-
related referendums reveals its peculiarities and pitfalls. The resulting mandate left 
the government some room for manoeuvre and initially offered plenty of options for 
its negotiations with Brussels. However, the government in London was not able to 
translate the tight “No” vote into a viable negotiating position. The EU insisted on 
negotiating exclusively with Her Majesty’s Government. Paradoxically, referendums 
in member states illustrate the European multi-level system’s dependence on states. 
Member states and the EU can both learn lessons by observing the British govern-
ment’s handling of the exit referendum. 
 
Since 1972, there have been 60 EU-related 
referendums held at the national level in 
Europe, but only in two of them – both in 
the UK – was leaving the EU an option: in 
1975 and in 2016. While elsewhere acces-
sion, treaty ratification, or individual policy 
issues (such as the introduction of the euro) 
were put to a vote, the exit referendum is a 
British specialty. The Brexit decision of June 
2016 is thus, on the one hand, part of a 
longer trend of EU politicisation, in which 
European issues increasingly have become 
the subject of public debate. On the other 
hand, the exit referendum represents a spe-
cial case in the history of EU-related refer-
endums. By interpreting the outcome ex-
tremely narrowly, the British government 
has further amplified the explosive power 
of the Brexit referendum. Their interpreta-
tion provides a starting point for explaining 
the drama of the exit negotiations. 
Referendums on EU Issues 
In the first 20 years (1951/52–1971) of 
European integration, referendums did not 
play any role, and in the following 20 years 
(1972–1991), they only played a subordi-
nate role. However, in the course of EU en-
largement, constitutionalisation, and politi-
cisation in the 1990s and 2000s, national 
referendums became a common instrument 
for legitimising European political reforms 
and decisions: 27 of the 60 EU-related refer-
endums were decisions on membership (i.e. 
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votes on membership application accession 
or withdrawal), 18 were for the ratification 
of European treaties, and the remaining 15 
concerned individual EU-related issues. The 
large majority – 43 of the 60 EU-related ref-
erendums – had outcomes that confirmed 
the positions of the national governments 
and allowed the EU to proceed as planned. 
In those cases where the majority of 
the population voted for an EU-sceptical 
option – thus opposing an uninterrupted 
course of EU reform or decision-making 
processes – both the national government 
and the EU were compelled to provide re-
sponses. In failed referendums on accession 
to the EU or the European Economic Area 
(Norway, Switzerland), alternative, some-
times complex arrangements had to be 
found, and rejected EU treaty reforms made 
renegotiations and clarifications necessary. 
EU referendums have thus become a rele-
vant factor in EU policy. 
National Referendums in the 
European Multi-level System 
Referendums are not held at the EU level. 
As a union of states and citizens, the EU 
is not a self-contained electoral body. In 
contrast to the elections to the European 
Parliament, no EU-wide referendums have 
been held simultaneously on the same 
topic at the level of the 28 member states. 
Not even the dates of the 10 announced 
national referendums for the ratification 
of the 2005 EU Constitutional Treaty were 
coordinated. In this respect, referendums 
remain territorially limited to the member 
states and are largely under their control. 
National provisions based on constitutional 
and political traditions apply, and there are 
no sets of rules for national referendums 
that are agreed upon or recommended at 
the EU level. 
Referendums in the EU member states 
always take place in a multi-level political 
system without any involvement of the 
supranational level. The EU institutions are 
simply presented with the outcomes and 
only become involved when referendums 
have a negative impact for the EU. An EU 
decision requiring consensus among all 
member states can be brought down by 
a referendum: If a referendum makes it 
difficult for a member to ratify EU treaty 
amendments or Association Agreements 
with third countries, for example, then the 
EU is at least prepared to clarify matters. 
However, negative referendum outcomes 
cannot directly prevent specific EU policy 
actions. A member’s “No” vote in the Coun-
cil that is backed politically by a referen-
dum has greater weight if a legal act re-
quires unanimity in the Council than in 
the case of qualified majority voting. The 
referendum held in Hungary in 2016 that 
rejected the introduction of a distribution 
mechanism for refugees at best politically 
strengthened the Hungarian government. 
But there was no need for the EU to take 
notice or react. 
Peculiarities of the Exit 
Referendum 
In referendums on accession, amendments 
to European treaties, or even individual 
issues, a “Yes” usually means agreement 
with a change to the status quo, which is 
laid down in legal texts (Accession Treaty, 
treaty changes, etc.), open to public scru-
tiny, and subject to legal review. In the event 
of a “No” vote, the status quo remains. In 
the Brexit vote, however, the population 
had a choice between the status quo (re-
main) and a leap into the dark (leave). Parts 
of the ruling Tory party advocated remain-
ing in the EU after Prime Minister David 
Cameron negotiated slightly altered mem-
bership conditions with the EU. However, 
the special provisions of the so-called Feb-
ruary Settlement were hardly mentioned in 
the referendum discourse. 
It remained vague as to what future 
relations with the EU would look like in 
concrete terms under the condition of in-
dependence. The only thing that was clear 
was that the withdrawal had to be based on 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). The withdrawal article is designed to 
 SWP Comment 24 
 April 2019 
 3 
protect the acquis communautaire and the 
interests of the remaining member states. 
Accordingly, the British government had to 
conclude an agreement with the Union on 
the details of the withdrawal, taking into 
account the framework for future relations. 
The undefined meaning of the “leave” vote 
gave rise to all sorts of projections. That is 
why the debate on future relations did not 
really begin until after the referendum. 
Ultimately, it depended on how the new 
government under Theresa May would 
interpret the tight result (51.9 to 48.1 per 
cent) and when it would put exit negotia-
tions into motion, which were to last two 
years. 
The extremely narrow interpretation of 
the referendum following the campaign 
for restoring national sovereignty and in-
dependence and regaining control over 
borders, jurisdiction, and finances marked 
red lines that Prime Minister May elevated 
to dogma: no customs union, no participa-
tion in the internal market and the four 
freedoms, and no jurisdiction for the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. With this rigid man-
date, the May government subjected itself 
to (erroneous) party-political calculations 
and pitfalls. From the outset, this excluded 
a number of tried and tested models of part-
nerships with third countries (European 
Economic Area, Turkey model) in the hopes 
of developing a unique new model. 
What Governments and the EU 
Can Do 
If a government does not receive the de-
sired approval for its position in an EU-
related referendum, it must (re-)position 
itself politically in both the national and 
EU arenas. The most important step is the 
interpretation of the vote’s outcome. Even 
if it is a binding vote and not a mere ad-
visory vote (as in the case of Brexit), it is 
up to the government to assess it. 
In 2005, the French and Dutch govern-
ments considered the rejection of the Con-
stitutional Treaty to be final. The EU had to 
accept the failure and make a new attempt 
with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the Danes 
voted twice on the identical Maastricht 
Treaty (1992/93), as did the Irish on the trea-
ties of Nice (2001/02) and Lisbon (2008/09). 
The governments thus created room for 
manoeuvre and dialogue with the EU insti-
tutions, and both agreed on clarifications, 
protocols, and anticipatory resolutions for 
future treaty changes. These amendments 
were put to a vote again without requiring 
the ratification process to be repeated in 
the other member states. Another example 
of flexibility and creativity on both sides 
is the struggle over the Association Agree-
ment with Ukraine, which Dutch voters 
rejected in 2016 in a referendum initiated 
by EU-sceptical associations. The govern-
ment then acted on individual points of 
criticism and obtained legally non-binding 
clarifications from the EU, but it ratified 
the agreement after it was adopted in par-
liament. 
Whether an exact implementation of 
the outcome of the vote is unavoidable 
depends, above all, on the strength and 
determination of the government and its 
ability to engage in dialogue with the popu-
lation and the political parties represented 
in parliament. The Tories’ severe losses in 
the early elections, the formation of a mi-
nority government tolerated by the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party, and the deepening 
divide on Brexit within and between the 
Conservative and Labour parties all pro-
vided adverse conditions for a pragmatic 
approach. There was also no real change 
of opinion in the electorate. As a result, 
neither the Leave nor the Remain camp 
clearly gained the upper hand. 
The repeated rejection of the Withdrawal 
Agreement in British Parliament shows that 
the government has not yet been able to 
offer an interpretation of the referendum 
outcome that can be approved by a major-
ity. Much therefore depends on the reposi-
tioning of the British government. Three 
possible paths emerge: Conservatives and 
Labour agree on the basic lines of future 
relations with the EU in the critical areas of 
external tariffs, free trade, and the internal 
market; new elections to the House of Com-
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mons; and/or a second referendum. It is up 
to the government and the House of Com-
mons whether one or more of these paths 
are taken. 
The EU saw the high turnout (72.2 per 
cent) for the Brexit referendum as a sign of 
legitimacy and did not press for a second 
referendum. In order not to jeopardise 
internal cohesion, the EU does not want 
to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement 
from November 2018. However, the 27 
member states are prepared to interpret or 
modify provisions in the Political Declara-
tion accompanying the Withdrawal Agree-
ment in such a way as to support an inter-
nal compromise in the UK and to pave the 
way for ratification of the Withdrawal 
Agreement. 
In addition to the two-level constella-
tion – whereby the government negotiates 
simultaneously with British actors and 
European partners – the time limit created 
incentives for tactical manoeuvring. The EU 
has extended the deadline twice already in 
order to give London room to find a com-
promise in the government and the House 
of Commons. In principle, the EU is de-
manding the adoption of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, but it is flexible in the choice 
of model for future relations – even if it 
means remaining in the EU. 
Political Lessons Learnt 
In the European multi-level system, national 
referendums are not the end, but part of a 
political process, even – and especially – 
when the government’s position is rejected. 
What is critical for moving forward is how 
the governments interpret the referendums’ 
outcomes, because governments are the 
negotiation partners for EU institutions and 
EU countries. 
Leaving the EU is a huge step. In this 
respect, legitimisation by means of a ref-
erendum is plausible. By analogy with con-
stitutional amendments, it would be advis-
able to establish a quorum of votes in favour 
that goes beyond the simple majority as 
well as a quorum for voter turnout in the 
respective member state. It should also 
be apparent to the electorate what a with-
drawal means for their future relations 
with the EU and what mandate the govern-
ment will be given with the vote. The EU 
institutions will remain reluctant to inter-
vene in referendum campaigns. However, 
parties and civil society may do so. 
It can be assumed that the provisions 
of Article 50 TEU will be examined more 
closely in light of first experiences from the 
Brexit process. The withdrawal article is 
deliberately not designed in a user-friendly 
way, as it is not intended to provide incen-
tives to renegotiate the rights and obliga-
tions of membership. At the same time, it 
must offer the state wishing to withdraw a 
viable way out of the Union. Whether this 
leads to a free fall, however, is largely up to 
the withdrawing state and its government. 
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